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ABSTRACT
Strategies to reduce carbon emissions are set to be a powerful force of
economic restructuring, creating new economic opportunities, and also
disruption and divestment for some firms and sectors. A pressing issue
for ‘just transitions’ is whether low carbon economic restructuring will
challenge or reinforce prevailing geographies of spatial inequality and
labour market (dis)advantage. In this article we return to the economic
restructuring literature of the 1980s and 1990s to provide a theoretical
framework for understanding ‘spatial divisions’ of low carbon work and
how they might be shaped to ensure economically just transition. Our
approach foregrounds questions of skills, training and pathways to
employment across supply chains as key dimensions of just transition,
providing a framework for analysis and intervention. The paper,
therefore, brings new critical perspectives on low carbon transitions by
conceptualising decarbonisation as a form of spatial economic
restructuring and its potential implications in reinforcing and/or working






Actions to reduce or contain carbon emissions to avert climate change are set to be a powerful force
of economic restructuring, creating new economic opportunities and also threatening jobs and
investment in sectors unable to adjust to fossil fuel divestment (McEvoy et al. 2000, OECD 2012a,
Newell and Mulvaney 2013). As decarbonisation starts to become reality, a pressing issue is
whether low carbon transitions will challenge or reinforce prevailing geographies of spatial inequal-
ity and labour market advantage and disadvantage. This has added salience in the context of post-
Covid recovery in countries like the UK, with calls from across political and civil society activists to
‘build back better’, emphasising the opportunity to use government recovery stimulus to catalyse
transition to a ‘green’ economy (IISD 2020).
There is now a range of literature on potential economic and employment impacts of decarbo-
nisation (Global Carbon Network 2009, OECD 2012a, 2012b). Literature has also begun to explore
the relationship between decarbonisation, regional development and regional inequality (Gibbs
and O’Neill 2014, 2017, Grillitsch and Hansen 2019, De Laurentis 2020, Trippl et al. 2020). As yet,
however, there has been limited critical examination of decarbonisation as a wider process of
spatial economic restructuring and its employment and labour market implications.
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In this article we return to the economic restructuring literature of the 1980s and 1990s to provide
a theoretical framework for understanding decarbonisation as spatial economic restructuring and
how this restructuring might be shaped to ensure socially just transition in economic development
and employment. A key aim of the paper is to think systematically about spatial and territorial impli-
cations of decarbonisation as processes of low carbon economic restructuring (LCER) that destabi-
lises some aspects of economic activity and industry sectors, and also creates opportunities for
new business development and job creation. Some of those changes will have particular territorial
ramifications (for example, increased investment in offshore wind farms, the decline in oil refineries),
which might or might not align with the existing economic geographies, but in other cases geo-
graphical patterning will reflect the locational choices of firms. Crucially, in all cases we argue that
implications for people and places will be shaped in significant ways by choices about government
investment in labour market and training policy, low carbon regulation and infrastructure
investment.
A key contribution of the paper is to examine a three-fold process through which (1) economic
restructuring impacts spatially in uneven and nuanced ways, and also produces (2) an uneven
spatial distribution in the quality of employment (in terms of pay and conditions and in-work train-
ing), and (3) public policy mediates (1) and (2), including possibilities to help support people and
places facing labour market disadvantage through a range of interventions. As such the paper
focuses centrally on the distribution of employment, taking forward insights initially developed in
the concept of spatial divisions of labour, which showed how the skewed spatial distribution of
lower skilled and professional labour was further reinforced by the tendency for higher value
work in manufacturing sectors to be located away from sites of production in more affluent
service sector locations (Massey 1984).
We start from the principle that a socially and economically just transitions policy should focus on
spatial distribution of quality and quantity of employment for different places, communities and
individuals. As Massey (1984) argues, there are powerful factors that reinforce uneven spatial devel-
opment over time through spatial divisions of labour. In particular, economic restructuring since the
1970s has largely accelerated and reinforced regional inequalities, in part; this is because the decline
of manufacturing employment and increased service sector employment has benefitted more
affluent regions, but there is a longer history of better paid and higher skilled work in supply
chains being located in more affluent regions as successive rounds of investment reinforce the pos-
ition of places within the wider spatial division of labour (Massey 1984). However, that process
always reflects the interaction between new spatial structures of economic restructuring and the
accumulated economic, cultural and infrastructural legacies of the past. These insights have poten-
tially significant implications for research on the impact of low carbon restructuring and policy
choices for governments.
The paper starts by setting a framework for understanding economic activity in relation to spatial
divisions of labour and the opportunities and challenges of economic restructuring. We then explore
implications of seeing decarbonisation as a process of economic restructuring. This is explored
further by highlighting exemplar dimensions of that restructuring process and what they might
mean for regional inequalities and spatial divisions of labour. A key theme emerging from the
paper is the importance of state intervention (and investment) in mediating economic development
and employment impacts of decarbonisation and this is explored further in the conclusions.
Methods
The argument and analysis of this paper draws on our involvement in a range of research projects on
economic development and decarbonisation over the last two decades and desk-based reviews of
literature and evidence. Our focus is specifically on ‘low carbon’ or rather ‘low carbon goods and ser-
vices’ as defined – for instance – in the UK government’s economic statistics (ONS 2020). A similar
analysis could be applied to wider spheres of environment and ‘green’ employment, or indeed
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employment associated with increased climate adaptation (e.g. flood control, green infrastructure).
That wider focus is important because low carbon is part of a wider green restructuring that has
potentially significant employment impacts, but we have focused solely on low carbon mitigation
to keep the paper manageable. It is possible that a low carbon transition might see emphasis on
reducing consumption and possibly some form of de-growth (Schlulz and Bailey 2014). It is also poss-
ible that low carbon transitions (de-growth or otherwise) might support broader changes in the
future and value of different types of work, especially in the context of automation (Bastani 2019).
A de-growth perspective is compatible with our analysis because we do not presuppose any level
of growth and our interest is in the geographical impacts of low carbon as a process of economic
restructuring. It might be argued that without some countervailing governmental strategy, the
net impact of de-growth will likely be to benefit more affluent areas that are less vulnerable to econ-
omic decline. De-growth as a political strategy will need to be mindful of its differentiated socio-
economic impacts and its socio-ecological benefits.
Economic restructuring, the state and spatial divisions of labour
Many factors shape the location of different economic activities in space and over time, including
proximity to natural resources, connectivity to markets or other producers, historical sunk costs of
investment in infrastructure and machinery, embedded skills and knowledge in economic clusters
and local labour markets, the costs and availability of land and labour relative to potential competing
places, and so on (Hudson 1988). Embedded within these factors are varying local, national and inter-
national regulatory and fiscal policies which affect potential competitiveness of firms. As Poon (2012,
no page) argues, ‘explaining economic activities in time and space assumes a multi-scalar perspec-
tive because economic space is found to be constituted at various scales from the local and regional
to the global or some combination of these’. As such, economic activity is about global production
networks and an international spatial distribution of labour (see Coe and Yeung 2019).
Our interest in this paper is on the reshaping of economic geographies through economic restruc-
turing that disrupts and alters spatial distributions of economic activity and employment, creating
different challenges and opportunities for different places. To varying extents, economic activity
and employment is constantly being ‘restructured’ as firms expand, diversify and decline, jobs are
created and jobs are lost. However, prevailing ‘structured coherences’ (Harvey 1985) and spatial
structures (Massey 1984) of economic activity will tend to remain more or less fixed unless there
are significant changes in production, transport or communications technology, new consumption
norms, changes in state strategy, political disruption or competition from other countries or regions
(Pinch 2001).
Economic restructuring is often associated with industrial decline, and specifically the decimation
of traditional manufacturing centres in Europe and North America in the 1970s and 1980s as man-
ufacturing moved internationally to regions with lower production costs. However, there are always
places and interests that benefit from economic restructuring too (Pinch 2001). Indeed, economic
decline of traditional industrial regions in the Global North in the 1980s was paralleled by the
growth of higher value manufacturing and services, primarily outside industrial heartlands, as well
as vast expansions of economic activity in East Asian countries as part of a new International
Spatial Division of Labour.
As Doreen Massey (1984) highlights, there is a tendency for regional specialisms and spatial
divisions of labour to persist over time because of the layering of rounds of economic activity and
socio-spatial relations (see also Dunford 2003). Research has revealed the nuanced and variable
ways economic restructuring impacted different places in the 1980s and 1990s depending on
their mix of comparative and competitive advantages (including for some the availability of relatively
cheap land and labour) (Jonas 1988, Massey 1991, Jones and Woods 2013). Processes of economic
restructuring, therefore, need to be understood as sectorally and geographically specific (Peck 2018):
for instance, some jobs and sectors are more footloose than others. It is important here – and for our
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analysis below – to note that firm mobility is often mediated by material conditions. The location of
natural resources, the existing infrastructure and environmental topographies can be important
factors in industrial location and restructuring outcomes (Hudson 1988). Although the spatial out-
comes of restructuring are not structurally determined, the character of each region and locality
can help shape its spatial impacts (Massey 1984).
Crucially, the social and spatial impact of economic restructuring is mediated by public policy in
various ways in the short-term and long-term. Analyses of UK manufacturing decline pointed to
policy failings over decades, but limited central government support in the 1980s, and in some
respects its deliberate dismantling for ideological reasons in favour of service sector growth, was
an important cause for the acceleration of this decline (Judge and Dickson 1987)
In this regard Mackinnon et al. (2019) review ideas around the notion of ‘path creation’, which
focuses on ‘emergence and growth of new industries and economic activities in regions’ (Mackinnon
et al. 2019, p. 114). A central concern is the ability of actors in places to work with and shape indus-
trial decision-making within and across production networks to cultivate conditions for investment
in new industries to create jobs and economic growth. Land use planning and infrastructure invest-
ment policies might shape locational patterning of economic activity; government financial incen-
tives and investment might be used to shape locational choices of firms, to attract and hold
down investment in the face of international competition or to address regional inequalities and
labour market disadvantage. Government investment in skills and employment support can affect
the ability of workers to access jobs and locational choices of different firms. The spatial distribution
of economic activity might also be influenced by innovation policies and infrastructure investments
or by environmental and labour control regimes. As we explore below, innovation and job creation
in the low carbon economy can be stimulated by environmental regulation, though jobs might also
be lost in sectors affected by those regulations.
The potential for state and non-state intervention to shape processes and outcomes of low
carbon restructuring is reflected in notions of ‘just transition’ (Newell and Mulvaney 2013). Emphasis,
in that framework, is placed on ensuring that investment in support of economic restructuring is
managed in ways that do not reinforce or extend the existing spatial inequalities, and ideally that
governments use powers of low carbon regulation and investment to address regional inequalities
and labour market disadvantage. This includes action to create opportunities for firms and workers in
areas most affected by restructuring and to ensure that decent work is evenly distributed, respecting
principles of social and spatial justice. The emphasis on decent jobs is particularly pertinent in the
context of increased job precarity in many countries and the rise of zero-hours and outsourced
work (Hudson-Sharp and Runge 2017).
Decarbonisation as economic restructuring
Governments around the world are gradually introducing more stringent frameworks for radically
reducing carbon emissions by decreasing or phasing out the use of fossil fuels such as oil, gas
and coal. This is a process of economic and societal decarbonisation. It is now common to talk
about a distinctive low carbon economy, as well as economic impacts of carbon legislation and
societal decarbonisation in different sectors and for the overall economy at international, national,
regional and local levels. We suggest that there are three main dimensions to economic restructuring
through decarbonisation.
First, decarbonisation will lead to decline over time in economic activity related directly to extrac-
tion, processing and sale of fossil fuels. Second, as a process of changing and revaluing fossil fuel
inputs (While and Eadson 2019, Eadson and While 2019), decarbonisation will also impact the exist-
ing forms of economic activity that currently depend on fossil fuels, including plastics, manufactur-
ing, cement, steel and metals processing, aspects of food production that depend on fossil fuel
fertilisers, and any industry whose business model is predicated on fossil fuel transportation.
Many of these industries will remain essential to a low carbon economy. But whether individual
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businesses in those sectors will decline, continue or flourish in a low carbon economy depends on
their ability to adapt and remain competitive when alternative energy and transport sources or raw
materials are used (Fankhauser 2013). This includes new spatial economic competition based on
reduced transport costs or access to reasonably priced renewable energy, green fuel and other
low carbon technology (Jonas et al. 2011, Hodson and Marvin 2012). Third, new forms of economic
activity and job creation will emerge or expand because of low carbon transitions, including pro-
duction of renewable energy (and its equipment supply chains), low carbon products and materials
and business support (Fankhauser and Kotsch 2018). There is considerable work by governments
and firms to anticipate future change, and also by governments to set out stable regulatory frame-
works, such as zero-carbon emissions targets to guide investment and restructuring decisions.
There are various projections of what LCER might mean for economic activity and employment
(OECD 2012, Blyth et al. 2014, ILO 2018, Pestel 2019). Yet quantifying future economic and employ-
ment impacts of decarbonisation is difficult because much will depend on choices made by govern-
ments about how to decarbonise, over what timescales, the balance of legislative and economic
instruments and the extent to which there are shared international frameworks. Equally important,
decarbonisation is not the only element of on-going economic restructuring and its economic and
employment impacts will be shaped by factors such as automation, changes in climate and weather
and responses to economic shocks such as the 2020–21 coronavirus pandemic. The economic
impact of decarbonisation will vary geographically depending on the mix of international, national
and sub-national carbon regulation, the differential exposure to that regulation and differential
opportunities and capacities to benefit, respond and adjust. There will never be a definitive
answer as to whether there will be more or less economic activity overall – or more of fewer jobs
– because of decarbonisation alone, especially as decarbonisation will always be a work in progress
and affected by other aspects of economic restructuring.
What is certain is that in the churn of economic activity and job loss/creation, the gains of the low
carbon economy will not be an exact replacement – in terms of skills level, pay and condition, acces-
sibility to those made unemployed, spatially – for what is lost. Some places and some workers will
gain and some will lose. For example, older workers in declining energy-intensive industries will
likely find it hard to find similar well paid or skilled work in low carbon work (Callan and Bowman
2015). In that respect a key issue will be to think about the differential impact of decarbonisation
on particular territories (countries, regions, places) and people within those places. Subsequent sec-
tions of this paper examine the nuanced geographies of low carbon restructuring in more detail.
As suggested in the section above, the outcomes of economic restructuring can be shaped in fun-
damental ways by state strategies. This is especially the case with low carbon restructuring because,
in addition to choices about whether and how to support adjustment of key employment sectors
and new sectors (through investment in equipment and technology, R&D and innovation policy,
tariff protections, start up support and so on) and the reskilling of workers, the pace and direction
of low carbon restructuring will also be shaped by choices over legislation and regulation. In
short, governments can take a long-term strategic view of decarbonisation pathways that might
include decisions about how best to manage the existing and future uneven development and
spatial inequalities. Elements of low carbon restructuring (and related emphasis on energy security)
could prompt rethinking the economics of outsourcing and build indigenous capacity in energy pro-
duction and key economic sectors. There is now a well-established literature on the need for just
transitions frameworks that reflect potential to address inequality and disadvantage through decar-
bonisation (Newell and Mulvaney 2013, Stevis and Felli 2015, Healy and Barry 2017).
Economic geographies of decarbonisation: four dimensions
The following sections examine different dimensions of LCER associated with decarbonisation, their
potential geographical impacts and the role of the state in mediating these impacts. We highlight
four key dimensions of socio-spatial impact:
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(1) New resource geographies of decarbonisation – some economic activities will develop around
natural resources that become more valuable in a low carbon future.
(2) Holding down energy-intensive industries – energy-intensive industry will still be required in a
low carbon future, but it will be more energy efficient and less dependent on fossil fuels. How
might geographies of low carbon infrastructure and renewable energy provision shape the
economic geography of energy-intensive business?
(3) Attracting and creating low carbon products and services – this dimension examines whether
low carbon growth sectors which are, in principle, geographically mobile will reinforce or chal-
lenge the existing spatial divisions of labour.
(4) Mitigating eco-precarity – this cross-cutting dimension highlights growing concerns about an
eco-precariat, highlighting the importance of understanding emerging spatial divisions of
labour and recognising that low carbon jobs are not automatically ‘good’ jobs.
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A summary of key themes and implications for spatial divisions of labour and the role of state
mediation are set out in Table 1.
Making the most of new resource geographies
There is a longstanding interest in economic geography on economic activity linked to particular
mineral, ecological or geological resources, including access to water, mining, ports and other
sources of natural comparative advantage (Bridge 2009). Fossil fuels have distinctive resource geo-
graphies relating to geological reserves of oil, coal and gas and also to infrastructures of transpor-
tation and processing of those raw materials, their impact on the location of energy-intensive
manufacturing, the burning of fossil fuels for energy in power plants and the manufacturing of
things that rely on fossil fuels (notably automobile plants) (Bridge 2011). Some of those comparative
economic advantages will be undermined by decarbonisation, as fossil fuels lose value and infra-
structures of fossil fuel processing become increasingly redundant. Energy-efficient manufacturing
will still be required, but its competitiveness and economic geography will be shaped by the
access to low carbon energy and the extent that rationales for investment in the existing plant
(or the employment and economic benefits) are sufficient to justify extra investment by firms or gov-
ernments in bespoke low carbon infrastructure. Places with high concentrations of fossil fuel depen-
dence as their economic base – ranging from Gulf states to mining and fuel processing communities
– will face pressing challenges of economic and employment decline.
The other side of low carbon resource geographies is the potential for some places to exploit
access to revalued geological and biophysical resources for renewable energy generation, biofuels,
low carbon materials, and possibly the capture and storage of fossil fuel emissions. There is already
considerable interest in the global economic geography of innovations and production in renewable
energy technology, including moves to protect national industries through import tariffs (Meckling
and Hughes 2018), especially given Chinese dominance of renewable energy technology (Mulvaney
2019). However, there is a distinctive resource geography dimension to renewable energy as jobs are
created around harnessing of wind, tidal and solar resources, biomass production or geological
resources for carbon capture and storage. All places, and especially cities, have the potential to gen-
erate jobs through energy-efficient measures and decentralised energy generation through the
installation and maintenance of machinery and equipment (even if jobs are lost as decentralisation
replaces power plants in other places). In the Global North and the Global South there is interest in
the potential to create meaningful pathways for urban employment in these sectors and to combine
employment, climate and social benefits through decentralised renewable energy (OECD 2012a,
2012b)
But levels of sunlight and onshore and offshore wind speeds can vary widely, as can the potential
for biomass and biofuel production (Elberson et al. 2012, World Bank 2020a, 2020b) and that includes
competing land use pressures and land values (Van Der Horst and Evans 2010). Thus some places are
becoming new economic centres for large-scale renewable energy generation, such as onshore or
offshore wind farms or large solar farms in the deserts of California. The direct employment gener-
ation of those facilities varies, but new economic centres act as clusters of economic activity in main-
tenance and management. For example, in the UK, proximity to powerful wind resources in the
North Sea and its well-developed port infrastructure has led to the Humber estuary becoming a
focal point for offshore wind industry, including a Siemens wind turbine factory (Jonas et al. 2017,
Jensen and Gibbs 2018). There are similar stories across the UK and in countries with a coastline
where wind power is being developed, as localities with active, redundant or underused ports
seek to establish a role as the service points for offshore wind. The UK Humber region is additionally
seeking to exploit its geological potential for carbon capture and storage to maintain and extend its
clusters of energy-intensive industry (Zero Carbon Humber 2020). Much of the employment gener-
ation in low carbon energy is about installation, servicing and maintenance of machinery and equip-
ment that make use of and develop the local skills base (Dawley et al. 2019).
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The extent that low carbon natural resource advantages are converted into local economic
benefit will depend on location, connectivity and broader decisions about low carbon regulation
and public and private investment in facilities and infrastructure. Indeed, power stations will con-
tinue to be significant employment generators if they switch from fossil fuels to biomass; and
sunk costs of power stations mean they will likely be prioritised in low carbon retrofit, sometimes
even if retrofit compromises low carbon goals (Cowell 2020). In relation to wind power, in
England local institutions do not have control over seabed use, which is the domain of the UK’s
Crown Estate. As such, onshore servicing development has been contingent on the Crown Estate
awarding marine sites to developers (Dawley et al. 2019) Furthermore, ports in the UK are privately
owned, which led to the competition between port owners across the Humber region. Lengthy plan-
ning and legal battles, concerns about the UK’s supply chain capabilities and an uncertain policy
context for renewable energy in the UK, almost led to the cancellation of the Siemens project on
the Humber Estuary before it was finally confirmed in 2014 (Dawley et al. 2019, Jensen and Gibbs
2018).
By contrast, in Germany a more interventionist industrial policy combined with stronger local
state strategic steering have produced a more variegated geography of turbine manufacture and
technology development, while coastal deployment sites have nonetheless become key cluster
points for the sector. One example is the city of Bremerhaven where local and regional state insti-
tutions were instrumental in developing offshore wind capabilities, including redevelopment of
former shipbuilding docks and proactive intervention to ensure colocation of manufacturing and
deployment through subsidies, fast-tracked planning consent and actively fostering networks
between firms to encourage the collaboration and development of co-benefits (Jonas et al. 2017,
Mackinnon et al. 2019). As well as stimulating local investment and firm creation, these policies
encouraged firms operating in the supply chain to relocate to the area from elsewhere in
Germany (Dawley et al. 2019). In 2014, around 4,000 people were employed in the Bremerhaven
offshore wind sector, compared to around 800 in Hull (Jonas et al. 2017).
A distinctive element of the development of offshore wind facilities is their re-use of port infra-
structures that had previously declined because of changes in shipping practices and fishing indus-
tries. At play here perhaps is the ‘geological’ process whereby infrastructure-intensive low carbon
development layers onto previous round of economic development and investment (see Massey
1984). However, an important issue that has been so far under-researched is the quality of jobs
created around new resource geographies (including issues of training, career progression and
access to work) and the spatial distribution of employment and labour across supply chains of
renewable energy generation. It should also be noted that these low carbon resource geographies
might result in lower carbon outcomes overall, but their infrastructure and operation is not necess-
arily clean and green (see for example, Mulvaney 2019). This aspect of ‘dirty’ green capitalism is often
to be found in less desirable places reflecting the previous industrial infrastructure of ports, power
plants and nuclear facilities.
Overall, across new economic resource geographies we see some layering of potential opportu-
nities in places with historic infrastructure (e.g. ports for windfarms; existing power stations for
biomass) and some new sites of economic potential for deployment of energy production technol-
ogies. In both instances the economic potential is not evenly distributed even between places with
similar resource potential. We also note that beyond the division of labour that sees manufacturing
processes more concentrated in older industrial places, more hazardous extraction processes tend to
be found in economically poorer places (typically in the Global South) with fewer worker or environ-
mental protections. What comes through is the critical role of state intervention through regulation
and also at local levels as mediators of emergent economic geographies: local state institutions and
partners as critical to path creation where the potential for economic development and employment
creation can be identified.
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Holding down energy-intensive industry
As suggested above, potential natural resource advantages only become economic advantages if
they are brought into being through investment choices of governments or the private sector. Dec-
arbonisation creates conditions to revalue not only natural resources but also new investment. As
the example of UK wind power demonstrates, this can result in spatial competition to become
service sectors of low carbon resource geographies, with clusters of economic activity building com-
petitive advantages.
Public and private infrastructure investment choices are also important as LCER impacts energy-
intensive and energy-sensitive industry. These are sectors that are not regulated out by low carbon
regulation – though they might be replaced or partially replaced by other materials or new pro-
duction processes – but they will be sensitive to increased energy and transport costs. Examples
include steel production, manufacturing plants, data hubs, cement production, controlled environ-
ment agriculture, and distribution centres. Aspects of that production might be phased out or pro-
duction efficiency improved, but they will remain as significant sources of employment in low carbon
transitions. In this respect, low carbon policies and regulation will layer onto other factors influencing
competitiveness, which will include variability of carbon regulation between and within countries.
Globally LCER has the potential to alter locational dynamics of aspects of the existing economic
activity in two dimensions. First, to the extent that carbon regulation is applied in similar ways to all
countries and sectors, the increased costs of carbon ‘outsourcing’ (i.e. where countries and firms
benefit from cheaper manufacturing in countries with less stringent carbon regulation) are likely
to alter decisions about where to locate manufacturing facilities. A common framework for low
carbon regulation could certainly support the return of manufacturing closer to places of consump-
tion, especially as labour costs increase in countries like China and as new technologies such as auto-
mation are used in manufacturing (Ancarani and Di Mauro 2018).
Second, governments will need to ensure that there is an appropriate low carbon energy infra-
structure to hold down and attract energy-intensive industry if those sectors are to be economically
competitive. Many countries now have decarbonisation plans for high-emitting industries (see for
example, BEIS 2017). This can include direct intervention in strategically important industries. In
Sweden the government’s energy agency has invested over US$50 million to support piloting
and demonstration of innovative low carbon steel manufacturing process through HYBRIT, a partner-
ship between Swedish state-owned energy company Vattenfall and iron and steel producers to
replace coke traditionally used in steel production with hydrogen (Bairstow 2019). The rationale
for the grant was to ensure long-term competitiveness of Swedish steel industry in the context of
decarbonisation imperatives (Vogl et al. 2018, Hildingsson et al. 2019). Because of perceived local
economic and employment benefits to places, there was a competition between the existing
steel plant locations, with lobbying from local stakeholders and trade unions for investment (Vogl
et al. 2018).
In most countries, the provision of energy infrastructure for industrial decarbonisation will be
determined by a combination of national, regional and local investment and management strategies
and initiatives such as Eco-Industrial Parks (EIPs). The principle behind EIPs is that firms can reduce
costs and environmental externalities by developing synergies with other firms located within the
EIP, for instance, by co-locating firms producing similar types of waste alongside a firm that special-
ises in using that waste to produce other products (Roberts 2004, Gibbs and Deutz 2007, Guo et al.
2017). Examples of this might include using water from industrial cooling processes to provide
heating to firms in EIPs, or processing sewage for different industrial and commercial uses (Gibbs
and Deutz 2007, Bellantuono et al. 2017).
High emitting sectors are not confined to production industries. For example, central to the func-
tioning of contemporary society are data centres, which remotely store, process and distribute data
from IT systems. They are also energy intensive, with resulting high GHG emissions: globally it is esti-
mated that data centres account for 1–2 per cent of total electricity usage (Coronan et al. 2019).
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Places and countries have often incentivised locations of data centres in their territories, with per-
ceived economic benefits following, including good quality jobs in construction and on-going oper-
ations of data centres (Grant Thornton 2018). Because of the energy intensity of data centres, as with
the examples provided above, national and regional governments have often provided some insula-
tion from rising energy costs and associated ‘green’ taxes: for instance in 2016, Sweden reduced its
electricity tax rate by 96 per cent for data centre developments. Other European countries also have
energy tax incentives in place. However, growing concern for the environmental impact of data
centres has led to more interest in providing low carbon solutions to reduce energy costs
(Coronan et al. 2019). These, in turn, have potential impacts for the location of data centres, and
as a result location of their economic benefits. In Sweden, tax incentives have been scaled back
and cities are looking at alternative measures to support data centres.
In Stockholm, for instance, local government uses data centre waste heat to fuel its district
heating systems. This has created an additional incentive for data centres to locate in the area, pro-
viding a source of income to offset energy costs (Biba 2017). Other locational advantages include
cold climates to reduce costs of cooling (Coronan et al. 2019) and some companies have also
explored under-sea data centres, which again might confer competitive advantage to coastal
cities. Canada, Scandinavia and even Ireland are seen as desirable locations, in part, due to cool cli-
mates and in some of these cases access to abundant renewable energy and/or cold-water sources
(Vertatique 2017). One high profile example of data centres locating for advantageous environ-
mental conditions is Facebook, which has constructed three data centres in Lulea, Sweden,
making use of the cold climate and abundant renewable hyrdoelectric energy to reduce energy
costs and carbon emissions. The decision to locate here was, however, influenced by an intensive
period of negotiation and lobbying from local government and economic agencies in Lulea,
against competition from other sites in Scandinavia (Harding 2015, Vonderau 2019). As with pro-
ductive industries, it is likely that low carbon infrastructural advantages will grow as a source of com-
petition for data centre location as LCER bites further.
Support for energy-intensive industry will also be important in strategies to benefit from manu-
facturing value chains for clean technology. As explored above, countries might seek to manufacture
wind turbines rather than simply install technology from elsewhere (see Lachapelle et al. 2017) and
manufacture close to deployment sites can reduce transport costs. One issue for global governance
of low carbon spatial divisions of labour could be to manage the changing landscape of competitive
advantage in affected sectors so that relocation of economic activity to more affluent nations (which
might have more resources to invest in low carbon energy) is balanced with the support for
countries where employment and investment might decline. This includes the prospect that
lower cost locations will be even more locked into dirtier, more dangerous and lower value
aspects of production and manufacturing, whilst more affluent nations continue to benefit from out-
sourcing those activities.
Again in this dimension of LCER we see how state intervention is important to creating conditions
for continued or new economic development in a low carbon transition. But, to some extent new
resource geographies are predicated on redeploying existing economic infrastructure allied to
resource access, an important aspect for holding down or attracting energy-intensive industry will
be the development of new low carbon urban infrastructures, and strategic selective investment
in demonstrations projects to reduce costs for high-emission sectors. The role of the entrepreneurial
local state (Harvey 1989) is important in attracting and retaining high-emission industry where it is
seen as important to local economic development. This implies the potential for reinforcing existing
divisions of labour between countries and places with varying capacity and willingness to invest and
shape low carbon infrastructure development to maintain comparative advantages.
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New low carbon growth sectors
Our third element of the new economic geography of decarbonisation relates to new economic
activity in the development, production and management of clean technologies (‘cleantech’) and
low carbon business services. Examples might include wind power technology, biofuel development,
nuclear facilities, driverless vehicles, electric vehicles, batteries and so on alongside green finance
and other aspects of business support. Economic activity in these sectors can reflect a mix of
R&D, manufacture and maintenance/services and that distinction is important for geographical pat-
terning of economic activity.
One question is the extent that these growth/sunrise sectors are layered onto (and might partially
replace) the existing centres of manufacturing, research and R&D. It might be expected that the
overlap between the existing centres and low carbon growth sectors will be particularly significant
for R&D, and green finance would certainly be expected to follow the existing geographies of
financial services: for instance, the location of the UK Green Investment Bank in Edinburgh reflects
the city’s history as a finance hub.
But as Demirel et al. (2019) show, relatively little is known about locational choices of green entre-
preneurs or the potential for geographic clusters of low carbon goods and services. One example is
the potential for green entrepreneurship around key decarbonisation facilities (see Section ‘New low
carbon growth sectors’) or around distinctive university and private sector research centres. Green
entrepreneurship might also come out of centres of alternative green economies developed
through active state intervention and citizen pressure (Gibbs and O’Neill 2017). Demirel et al.
(2019, p.763) indicate, ‘increasing attention has been devoted to the relationship between environ-
mental innovation, business activity and regional policy’. Gibbs and O’Neill (2017) for example, show
how ‘the worldwide No. 1 green tech cluster’ (Eco World 2015, in Gibbs and O’Neill 2017 p.166) in the
Styria region of Austria has developed through a combination of bottom-up support for green econ-
omic development and regional policy measures, including strong partnerships between research,
industry and policy organisations. In Styria, a history of high-polluting steel and paper manufacturing
created pressures for more sustainability focused economic development (van Heyningen and Brent
2012). A central element of this has been a government-supported networking and business support
organisation (Eco World Syria), which also seeks to connect Styrian businesses to new markets and
technologies, as well as acting as a branding initiative for the region’s cleantech activities. Local regu-
lation and support for renewable energy has also created a favourable context for low carbon invest-
ment (Gibbs and O’Neill 2017). Bremerhaven (see Section ‘Holding down energy-intensive industry’)
provides another example of long-term state support to develop cleantech clusters, as does the Ruhr
Valley in Germany. In the Ruhr Valley, experience of innovation to minimise environmental impacts
of coal and steel production to meet regulations meant people and firms in the area were well-
placed to develop new environmental technologies and – supported by local and regional state
investment, also involving local universities – the Ruhr Valley has become an environmental technol-
ogy hub, employing around 100,000 people (Galgóczi 2014).
Emergence of cleantech clusters in particular places, ‘has not been a matter of chance’ (Tveldt
2019, p.54). Clusters, which attempt to break the existing path-dependencies and economic geogra-
phies, rely on long-term strategic state support, including employment and skill initiatives. Emergent
cleantech clusters have also tended to develop from the existing economic strengths: Tveldt (2019)
outlines the importance of the existing strengths in biosciences in San Diego as a starting point for a
new cleantech cluster; and the existing ICT prowess in Dublin. In Bremerhaven and the Ruhr clusters
have developed aroundmanufacturing and industrial processes, which continue to have strong loca-
tional ties (around cheaper labour, physical resources and so on). In each case there is a coupling of
R&D investment alongside expertise in the existing industries complementary to cleantech
development.
Overall, the path of least resistance is for cleantech clusters to emerge where high-tech R&D is
already prevalent. This assertion is reinforced by the geographic analysis of cleantech start-ups by
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Marra et al. (2017), finding the largest concentrations in already R&D-heavy metropolitan areas such
as San Francisco (the largest concentration, accounting for 7 per cent of start-ups identified), London
(5.8 per cent), New York (4.7 per cent), Cambridge (4.6 per cent), San Jose (3.3 per cent), Austin (3.1
per cent) and Boston (3.1 per cent). In general, then, although new resource geographies of low
carbon create possibilities for changing pathways of economic development in some places,
without strategic state support it is likely that the overall pattern of cleantech activity will follow
pathways produced in previous rounds of restructuring since the 1960s and 1970s. The relative
mobility of these sectors perhaps makes it less likely for them to ‘choose’ to locate in peripheral
places close to heavy manufacturing and with historically lower skill levels. Whereas high emission
industry might relocate for lower employment or regulatory costs, higher skilled cleantech jobs are
more likely to cling to places where higher skilled labour and associated ‘creative milieu’ can be
found. The examples of Bremerhaven and the Ruhr provide an example where labour processes
across production – from R&D through manufacturing – have been brought together locally. But
that has required early intervention within industrial lifecycles and long-term strategic investment
by local and national state institutions to shift embedded labour geographies.
Employment in the low carbon economy
So far our mapping of different dimensions of decarbonising economic geographies has focused
mainly on the location of different types of economic activity. However, as outlined in our theoretical
framing, a just transitions perspective is not simply interested in the spatial distribution of economic
activity. It asks questions about what that means for spatial distribution of employment overall,
emphasising distribution of types of job, including pay, working conditions and training opportu-
nities. This includes the potential to create meaningful new pathways to employment for different
disadvantaged groups and meaningful alternative pathways to employment for those whose jobs
are lost or downgraded because of decarbonisation or the combination of decarbonisation and
other factors (such as automation). There might be the potential for pathways to employment to
be created around localised low carbon restructuring initiatives (low carbon infrastructure projects
or energy-efficient measures) or new low carbon facilities (for example, increased food growing in
cities).
In this context, there is a growing volume of work critically appraising the nature of work gener-
ated by green capitalism and the low carbon economy. Neimark et al. (2020) talk of a new eco-pre-
cariat in which certain subsistence-level economic activities might become outlawed or heavily
proscribed through increasingly stringent carbon control, particularly affecting people in the
global south. In urban areas across the globe there are long-established informal economic
sectors involved in waste collection, reuse and recycling, often offering a precarious source of
income for homeless people (Rogerson 2001, Bisschop and Coletto 2017). There is also evidence
of an emergent eco-gig or casual economy for certain forms of activity involved in the low
carbon transition. Castellini (2019) highlights these trends through the analysis of the Toronto
(Canada) ‘green’ labour market. They draw attention to a green economy which ‘not only uncritically
accepts precarious labour, but also experiments with innovative ways to justify it’ (Castellini 2019,
p. 64): for instance, through framing environmental work as morally rewarding or as a ‘life’s work’
to justify low or no pay, flexible working patterns and relatively uninspiring work.
Furthermore, the green economy is framed in job adverts as a new and exciting sector of work,
using the language of agility, flexibility and dynamism seen in other, more technologically driven
start-up industries to justify the need for workers to ‘react positively to flexibility-driven labour
regimes’ (Castellini 2019, p. 67). This example shows how the development of new economic
sectors, as a function of economic restructuring, can provide a point of departure from the existing
path dependencies around, for example, employment practices or industrial relations (or at least
accelerate emergent trends).
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Even within industries that are touted as providing good quality, skilled work, such as offshore
wind, there is evidence that jobs can be insecure, involve high prevalence of agency workers and
that there are variable levels of unionisation and worker representation in formal decision-making
(Schulte 2016). It is useful to look in a little more detail at the offshore wind industry given the
vaunted potential for employment generation. Like Schulte (Schulte 2016) Mette et al. (2017) also
highlight the varying conditions for people working in offshore wind. They outline employee experi-
ences of working offshore in the German wind industry, drawing attention to the physically demand-
ing work involved, including peer-pressure to work in difficult or unsafe weather conditions. Workers’
work-long shifts, described as ‘lengthy and tedious’ (p. 5) and a feeling that workers were constantly
working interspersed with days waiting on board ships waiting for the right weather conditions to
carry out installations or maintenance.
In a study of offshore wind manufacturing in Denmark, Germany and the UK, Schulte (2016) found
that ‘in general job quality is low’, with a dualised labour market of a large number of sub-contracted
temporary agency workers and better paid, more secure employment for fewer workers directly
employed by offshore firms. An uncertain market and policy environment in each country had con-
tributed to volatile demand for offshore wind construction, which encouraged the use of temporary
over permanent staff, and also meant that ‘core’ staff positions were also uncertain and the relatively
high numbers of agency staff on lower wages also helped to depress wages for ‘core’ staff. Auto-
mation has also led to reduced need for workers in manufacturing and assembly. Since 2017 contrac-
tors in the UK have made use of temporary relaxation in immigration rules for the offshore wind
sector to bring in migrant workers specifically to work on offshore wind sites, reportedly employed
at rates significantly below the minimum wage (The Guardian 2018).
Technologies, central to low carbon transition, such as wind turbines, batteries and solar PV, all
still require mineral resources for their construction. As briefly noted in Section ‘Holding down
energy-intensive industry’, the analysis of production networks for some of these products brings
to light distanciated chains of exploitation in these green industries. Mulvaney (2019) draws atten-
tion to how workers involved in production processes for Solar PV – often in lower-income nations
with less stringent employment regulations – can, therefore, become exposed to hazardous
materials, with potentially serious health effects, while Murphy and Elimä (2021) also highlight the
use of forced labour in PV production chains. At the source of extraction, Aranoff et al. (2019)
explore how lithium extraction by multi-national corporations in the South American Andes is dama-
ging local ecosytems which, in turn, threaten local indigenous economies, particularly agriculture.
This is a common story of industrial and extractive capitalism, but the point here is to show that
the low carbon economy is not intrinsically different without regulation and support to prevent
economic and labour exploitation.
More broadly, the intersectional patterns of inclusion and exclusion in the existing economic
activities will not necessarily be reproduced in the emergent green economy. There is already evi-
dence that women are less able to access better paid jobs in low carbon sectors (Baruah 2017,
Clarke et al. 2017), and that other vulnerable population groups such as migrants are dispropor-
tionately represented in ‘dirty’ green jobs like waste recycling (see Gregson et al. 2016). There is
also a question of what kind of work gets valued in the low carbon transition. While women are
less likely to access highly rewarded green jobs they are also more likely to do the unpaid, every-
day labour of the low carbon economy, household recycling being one example (Wilson and Chu
2019). At the same time in the global north, the ability to engage in unpaid labour beyond the
home through volunteering in low carbon initiatives, for example, remains more the preserve of
wealthier, older (often retired), White people, and are also more likely to be men (Smith 2011,
Aiken 2012, Felicetti 2013, Grossman and Creamer 2017, Creamer et al. 2018).
So, it should not be assumed that all green jobs are good jobs in the global north and in the
global south; or that the ability to take part in low carbon transition will be equal for everyone
within places. Although there is scope for decarbonisation to create new opportunities in deprived
regions and communities, as outlined throughout this paper, there are significant concerns that the
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multiple potential spatial divisions of low carbon labour will serve to reinforce employment advan-
tages of privileged areas at the expense of less affluent areas. As in previous rounds of restructuring
jobs, created in less affluent areas, might be offset by the decline in carbon-intensive sectors, with
new jobs not replacing lost jobs in quantity, skill level or pay or suitability for different kinds of
workers.
Again, the issue of wider government policies comes into play in terms of labour market regu-
lation, commitments to quality employment and commitments to addressing regional economic
and employment inequalities. Indeed, there will be a key role for national and regional governments
to avoid the tendency of decarbonisation to reflect or reinforce the existing employment inequal-
ities. This might include initiatives to support low carbon industries or add value to the existing clus-
ters or sites of low carbon job creation. Proactive strategies might seek to distribute higher value
economic activity, investing in meaningful pathways to employment for different groups and com-
munities. However, if there is talk of an eco-precariat it is largely because of limited intervention
around wages, job security, working conditions and pathways to employment. In other words, the
issue is not that there is a mix of jobs, but rather that disadvantaged groups and communities
should not be locked into low paid and low value work. One danger is that maintaining an eco-pre-
cariat will be part of attempts to reduce costs of decarbonisation, both reflecting and reinforcing the
devaluation of some low carbon job sectors. A green workfare strategy, for example, might provide a
significant reserve army of labour for the expansion of informalised dirty jobs that sustain the green
economy.
Conclusions
This article has advanced the concepts of decarbonising economic geographies and low carbon
spatial divisions of labour to examine the potential implications of decarbonisation for uneven geo-
graphical development, regional inequalities and labour market (dis)advantage. The theoretical con-
tribution of this paper has been to develop frameworks for understanding issues of regional
inequality and labour market disadvantage in relation to decarbonisation. The employment dimen-
sion is, we argue, particularly important from the perspective of just transitions, but so far, it has been
underdeveloped in analytical work on the low carbon economy. We have found it particularly useful
to frame decarbonisation within the literature on economic restructuring of the 1980s and 1990s,
drawing on concepts such as spatial divisions of labour, as advanced by Doreen Massey (1984).
The article has set out a framework for understanding how carbon restructuring might impact
spatial structures of economic development and specifically whether there is the potential to
create new employment pathways for disadvantaged areas and communities, for example, in
relation to new resource geographies of renewable energy generation and the manufacture of clean-
tech equipment. These opportunities will not necessarily reverse the tendency for higher skilled
employment within supply chains to be located in more affluent regions with an existing R&D
base, but the spatial dependence of some aspects of low carbon restructuring does create opportu-
nities to build skills and R&D capacities in less favoured regions within a relatively stable growth and
investment framework. In that respect it is important to explore and understand the contingent
relationship between decarbonised economic geography and the existing spatial structures of
regions and localities, including the outcomes of potentially intense spatial competition for new
economic activity and the role of government investment in shaping economic possibilities for
different places. As such, the broad notion of spatial divisions of labour is particularly relevant to
interrogating the fine-grained socio-economic impacts of decarbonisation. This includes questions
about whether contemporary restructuring in sectors such as decarbonisation might help flesh
out and develop the notion of spatial divisions of labour in the context of intensified outsourcing
and global supply chains.
Above all, the paper provides further evidence of the importance of state intervention and invest-
ment in mediating processes of economic restructuring. Some disadvantaged communities and
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individuals will benefit from the economic churn of decarbonisation, but the geographical distri-
bution of employment opportunities will be shaped fundamentally by the patterns of infrastructural
investment and provision of bespoke training and employment schemes that can attract and hold
down low carbon economic activity in disadvantaged places. There will be a key role for national and
regional governments to mediate the tendency of decarbonisation to reflect and perhaps reinforce
the existing employment inequalities. This might include initiatives to support low carbon industries
or add value to the existing clusters or sites of low carbon job creation. This complements more
recent work on Global Production Networks of decarbonisation (see e.g. Hughes and Quitzow
2018) by drawing attention to relational interplay between spatial divisions of labour and local
labour/economic development regimes.
There are other factors that might shape employment outcomes of decarbonisation. Automation
of work, for example, will have fundamental implications for the number of jobs available, their
quality and spatial distribution. Automation will also alter the landscape of employment advantage
and disadvantage. However, a central argument of this paper is that it is possible to start planning
now for future low carbon economic restructuring, and that doing so could help meet the twin goals
of addressing employment inequalities and supporting low carbon transitions. This is especially
important in the post-COVID19 economic recovery that might provide a platform for a stronger
emphasis on the employment generation potential of decarbonisation.
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